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Sufficiently Supervised Commissioned Workers:
Mythical Beasts Sculpted from Old Law
I. INTRODUCTION: A MODERN FAIRY TALE
One day Behemoth Corporation approached Famous Artist with an
offer for her to design its latest product. Famous agreed to sculpt a
fire-breathing dragon to serve as a model for aluminum castings.
Priscilla, president of Behemoth, was fascinated by Famous's artistic
ability. She also had certain ideas about how a dragon's snout should
look, so she frequently visited Famous's studio, stood over her shoul-
der, and made suggestions whenever possible. Despite Priscilla's
help, the mythical beast was completed. A few days later, Behemoth
started casting replicas, and Famous sent them an invoice for $9000.
All was well until Priscilla refused to pay Famous, claiming that the
fee was too high. Famous ran to her attorney, Merlin, for advice. In
order to persuade Priscilla to pay, Merlin advised Famous to register
copyright and file for an injunction to cease production of the drag-
ons. After a few days, the parties met in court and Famous was
thrown out for lack of copyright ownership. Bewildered by the out-
come, Merlin later explained that while Famous was shaping stone
into art, Priscilla's overbearing presence transformed a commissioned
artist into an employee.
As a part of the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress designed the
"work made for hire" definition to distinguish between works pre-
pared on commission and works prepared by an employee within the
scope of employment. This comment discusses the following: 1)
what the "work made for hire" provisions mean in light of the legis-
lative history; 2) how corporate compliance with the provisions has
adversely affected commissioned workers; 3) how recent court cases
have resulted in obsolete interpretations of the "work made for hire"
definition; and 4) what is being done by the Legislature to clarify the
present definition of "work made for hire."
II. THE NEW WORK MADE FOR HIRE PROVISION: THIS KNIGHT
SERVES TWO MASTERS
The Copyright Act of 1976,1 [hereinafter the New Act] provides
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
that in the case of a "work made for hire," the employer, or other
person for whom the copyrightable work was prepared, is considered
both the author and the owner of all of the rights comprised in the
copyright. Furthermore, the New Act says that employers shall own
the copyright to the "work made for hire" unless the parties have ex-
pressly agreed to the contrary in a written agreement signed by
them.2 However, the New Act defines a "work made for hire" as
either: (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment; or (2) a specially ordered or commissioned work
that fits into one of nine specific categories if the parties expressly
agree in a signed written instrument that the work shall be consid-
ered a "work made for hire."3 The nine categories are: a contribution
to a collective work; a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work; a translation; a supplementary work; a compilation; an instruc-
tional text; a test; answer material for a test; and an atlas.4 Where
2. Works Made for Hire-In the case of a work made for hire, the employer
or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for
purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise
in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in
the copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
Section 102(a) defines copyrightable work. It states that "[c]opyright protection sub-
sists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
Copyright ownership comprises the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individ-
ual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display copy-
righted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
The designation as a work made for hire also affects duration, renewal, and termina-
tion rights. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1982); see Angel & Tannenbaum, Works Made for Hire
Under S. 22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209 (1976).
3. A "work made for hire" is:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties ex-
pressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
4. Id.
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the commissioned work does not fall into one of the nine categories,
it cannot qualify as "work made for hire" even if the parties so
agree. 5 Famous's dragon, for example, should not qualify as "work
made for hire" because sculptured works are not included among the
nine categories.
Before the New Act took effect on January 1, 1978, the common
law presumption was that copyright ownership of a commissioned
work would vest in the commissioning party, unless the intention of
the parties proved otherwise.6 However, the reason for changing the
common law "work made for hire" definition was to create a provi-
sion compromising the separate interests of employers and commis-
sioned workers. 7 The House Report, which explains the New Act,
states:
The basic problem is how to draw a statutory line between those works writ-
ten on special order or commission that should be considered as 'works made
for hire,' and those that should not. The definition now provided by the bill
represents a compromise which, in effect, spells out those specific categories
of commissioned works that can be considered 'works made for hire' under
certain circumstances.
8
Part of the rationale for Congress's giving greater rights to com-
missioned workers is constitutional. Article I grants Congress the
legislative power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."9 Such a
5. If a work does not fall within one of the above categories, then even if it
has been prepared by one person upon the special order or commission of an-
other, it will not qualify as a 'work made for hire,' with the special legal con-
sequences which flow from this designation.
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03(B)(2)(a) (1986).
6. Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.
1966) (where copyright ownership cannot be determined based on the intent of the
parties, the presumption of ownership runs in favor of the employer); Lin-Brook
Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965) (where a party is commis-
sioned by another, it is presumed that the mutual intent of the parties is that copyright
ownership vests in the commissioning party); Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108
F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939) (in the absence of proof that the parties intended that the com-
missioned artist own the copyright, copyright ownership vested in the city which com-
missioned the artist).
7. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737.
8. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. James Madison, chronicler of the debates in the
Constitutional Convention, stated in regard to the efficacy and purpose of the patents
and copyright clause:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common law.
The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the in-
mandate would seem to go against the idea that copyright ownership
could ever vest in an employer. Indeed, the issue has arisen in the
past, but the Supreme Court has found that "work made for hire"
provisions are constitutional.0
Congressional intent that copyright law conform to constitutional
requirements was accomplished by designing the New Act so that
copyright ownership would normally vest in commissioned work-
ers.'1 Comparison of the "work made for hire" definition in a 1963
preliminary draft bill to the final bill of 1976 illustrates this point.
The 1963 draft bill did not permit any commissioned works to qualify
as "works made for hire."12 The final draft of the bill was longer be-
cause Congress added the nine specific categories as exceptions to all
the other types of commissioned works, provided the parties agree in
ventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of
individuals.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 288 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
10. The Supreme Court ruled that the employer held the copyright in the creative
products of its employees. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239
(1903); see also M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1.06(C) (1986) (Employers as Authors).
This point has been questioned as unconstitutional and unfair to employees. At the
legislative discussions for the New Act, screenwriters and composers for motion pic-
tures proposed a "shop right" for employees. Patent law uses the "shop right" doc-
trine, which means that "with some exceptions, the employer would acquire the right
to use the employee's work to the extent needed for purposes of his or her regular
business, but the employee would retain all other rights as long as he or she refrained
from the authorizing of competing uses." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737.
The "shop right" doctrine would also preserve the right to a copyright for the crea-
tor if a corporate owner was no longer a going concern. Hearings on H.R. 4347, HR.
5680, HR. 6831, and HR, 6855 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Comm. of the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966).
At least two commentators have stated that these recommendations to change own-
ership rights of employers and employees were not adopted for the following reasons:
1) difficulty to statutorily define whether or not a particular use of a work competes
with the employer's use; 2) impracticalities of dividing rights where it is the product of
multiple employees; 3) users of works would not know with whom they were to nego-
tiate so as to acquire the necessary rights. Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 2, at 212.
The overall reasons for granting all rights to an employer are: "(1) the work is pro-
duced for the employer and under his direction; (2) the employee is compensated for
his work; and (3) since the employer pays the costs and bears the risk of any loss, he
should reap any gains." Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 2, at 211, n.8.
The House Report notes that a reason for retaining "employer for hire" and re-
jecting the "shop right" doctrine is: "The pesumption [sic] that initial ownership rights
vest in the employer for hire is well established in American copyright law...." H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5659, 5737. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 and THE FEDERALIST, supra
note 9, at 288.
11. Supplementary Report of Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of
U.S. Copyright Law, 66 (1965) [hereinafter Supplementary Report] reprinted in COPY-
RIGHT LAW REVISION Part 6, 4 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 66
(1976).
12. Id.
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writing that the work is "for hire."'13 Furthermore, in the process of
developing the bill, the special interest groups, which are represented
by one or more of the nine categories, had to convince Congress that
certain corporate entities could be creators for copyright purposes.14
III. THE COMMISSIONED WORKER: A DAMSEL IN DISTRESS
Despite the "carefully balanced compromise"' 5 that emerged as the
New Act, independent contractors whose work falls into one of the
13. M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 5.03(B)(2)(a) (1986).
For an invaluable overview of the New Act and an index to the legislative history
see, A. LATMAN & J. LIGHTSTONE, THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT: A
COMPENDIUM AND ANALYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT
OF 1976, at 327-77 (1983).
The Project does not contain the development of the New Act definitions because
§ 101 was never commissioned to a researcher. Interview with Daphne Gronich, Copy-
right and Litigation Counsel, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., (Apr. 11, 1986) (Ms.
Gronich researched some of the sections in the Project).
14. PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND
COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT, 274 (1964), [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT] reprinted in
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Part 3, 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY 255 (1976). TANNENBAUM:
The cases do hold that 'employment for hire' exists where there is the rela-
tionship of 'master and servant,' that is, where the person receives compensa-
tion and is subject to control and regulation by the person for whom he
performs the work.
KARP:
[S]ome of the difficulty ... is that we are trying to lump together two situa-
tions that are really inconsistent and unrelated. I don't disagree ... that a
motion picture is a work authored by a motion picture company .... It's a
composite work ....
I am concerned about the situation where someone orders a book written....
The book is written by the author, the man who sat down and wrote it. Then
somebody else says, 'I am the author under this section, because I was your
employer-for-hire.'...
Now, you've got entirely different situations. In one case you've got a compos-
ite work in which the producer brings together the efforts of many creative
skills and talents and merges them.... In the other, you've got a work writ-
ten by a natural author, and 'author' as the word was used in the Constitution.
Then you have a definition here [as suggested by Tannenbaum] which would
open the door to persons who could not be deemed the author to come in and
claim so-called 'authorship' under a presumption which I think is unnatural:
that the man who paid the money to the man who did the writing thereby
became the author of the work.
Id.
This quotation is from the Discussion and Comments section attached to a prelimi-
nary draft of what became the Copyright Act of 1976. The legislative process spanned
a period of sixteen years. These quotes are excerpts from a discussion on June 11, 1963
by an advisory committee of copyright experts representing special interest groups.
Samuel W. Tannenbaum spoke on behalf of the law firm Johnson & Tannenbaum. Ir-
win Karp represented the Authors League of America. Id. at 255-56.
15. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
nine categories have complained about a variety of abuses.16 The
abuses have mostly been attributed to companies in the publishing
industry who have allegedly exerted unequal bargaining power upon
freelance writers and artists.17
In the past, a magazine publisher, for example, would purchase
from the writer the right to publish an article in North America for
use in one issue only. The rights for publication in issues distributed
in other geographical areas would involve a separate transaction be-
tween the publisher and the writer. This practice had enabled com-
missioned writers to retain their rights as copyright owners and
receive additional remuneration by selling the same work in other
markets and media.18
In a "work for hire" situation, however, writers generally do not
retain any saleable rights. Unfortunately for freelance writers, when
the New Act took effect, publishers commanded that they sign "work
for hire" contracts in order for copyright ownership to vest in the
company rather than the actual creator.19
The reality of this situation was depicted by a frail young illustra-
tor, Robin Brickman, when she spoke to the Committee on the Judi-
ciary to amend the New Act.20 She explained that a corporate
publisher commissioned her to do twenty-seven black and white il-
lustrations for the interior pages of a wildlife book. When she tried
to negotiate for either more money or a limited use contract, the pub-
lisher's art director made it clear to her that agreeing to "work for
hire" was a prerequisite to getting the job. Since she needed the
money, Robin signed the agreement and thereby relinquished all
present and future rights to the drawings. After the drawings were
completed, the publisher, without the artist's knowledge or consent,
chose one of the interior drawings, added color to it, and used it as
16. The inequities experienced by authors have prompted amendment of the
Copyright Act of 1976. A Bill to Amend the Copyright Law Regarding Work for Hire:
Hearing on S. 2044 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1982)
[hereinafter Hearing on S. 2044].
Customarily, a freelance magazine writer sells the first North American pub-
lication rights to a magazine publisher and negotiates whatever additional
rights the publisher may wish to purchase for additional remuneration....
Some publishers have seized the wording of part 2 of the work made for hire
definition dealing with a work that is specially ordered or commissioned for
use as a contribution to collective work as an excuse to write contracts that
give themselves the copyright and all the inherent rights therein. The con-
tracts that are offered by these publishers are considered by our membership
to be an act of piracy.
Id. (Statement of June Roth, President of the American Society of Journalists and Au-
thors); see also the statement by a representative of The Authors League of America,
Irwin Karp. Id. at 7-8.
17. Id. at 2-4.
18. Id. at 4-5.
19. Id.
20. See Hearing on S. 2044, supra note 16, at 2.
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the book jacket without further compensating Robin. She summa-
rized the ordeal when she said, "The theft of my income was sanc-
tioned by copyright law."2'
In addition to relinquishing the benefits of copyright ownership,
commissioned workers for hire are denied state benefits. Except in
California, commissioned workers are ineligible for unemployment,
workers compensation, and disability insurance because they are not
employees.22 Furthermore, they are not eligible for company benefits
that employees are entitled to. Robin Brickman expressed her situa-
tion as follows:
It is important to you to understand what work for hire means to me. I do not
have any of the usual benefits an employee can expect. I have to pay for my
studio, utilities, art supplies, and equipment. I do not get group health insur-
ance, paid vacations, sick leave, or unemployment insurance. I feel trapped.
2 3
To the Rescue: More Legislation?
Congress did not intend to intensify the commissioned workers'
predicament when it drafted the New Act.2 4 Likewise, the commis-
sioned worker's current situation has not gone unnoticed. Senate
Bills S. 2044, S. 2138, and S. 2330 were introduced to amend the
"work made for hire" provisions. S. 2330 was introduced very re-
cently and will be discussed at the conclusion of the comment.
S. 2044 would have eliminated three categories from the "work
made for hire" definition. The three categories were: 1) contribu-
tions to magazines, anthologies, encyclopedia or other "collective
work"; 2) components of a motion picture or other audiovisual work;
and 3) instructional texts. 25 The bill, introduced by Senator Thad
Cochran in 1982, was not acted upon by Congress. In the following
year the Senator introduced Senate Bill S. 2138, which was more
forceful than the previous bill.26 The modifications were based on
21. Id. at 2-4 (Statement of Robin Brickman, professional illustrator). In 1979
Robin's gross income was $6995. Eighty-three percent of that income was derived from
work for hire. Her 1980 income was $8455, with work for hire comprising fifty-nine
percent of the income. The book jacket was worth an additional $500-800 income. Id.
at 3.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. In California, however, creators of commissioned works are eligible for un-
employment, workers' compensation, and disability insurance benefits. See CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3351.5(c) (West 1971 & Supp. 1987); see also Colby, Copyright Revision Revis-
iteck" Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire under the United States Copyright
Act, 5 WHrIriER L. REV. 491, 513 n.58 (1983).
24. Supplementary Report, supra note 11, at 66.
25. S. 2044, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1982).
26. S. 2138, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see also Crawford, Copyright" The Issue of
the plight of the commissioned worker which became more apparent
in the Senate Hearings for Senate Bill S. 2044.27 In addition to elimi-
nating categories from the "work for hire" definition, Senate Bill S.
2138 would have provided that all rights which a commissioned
worker assigns must be specifically enumerated in a written agree-
ment with separate compensation paid for each right. The bill also
would have mandated that the commissioning party may only acquire
the rights to a work that it reasonably expected to exercise. 28 The
desired result was to allow copyright ownership to vest in the true
creator, to equalize the bargaining power between authors and com-
missioning parties, and to give authors an opportunity to exploit their
creations further.
Another provision of the bill would have helped commissioned
workers to obtain federal social security benefits. Senate Bill S. 2138
provided that a commissioning party who failed to withhold social se-
curity and income taxes would not be presumed an employer.29 As a
result, the amendment would have provided a much needed clarifica-
tion for the ambiguous definition of "employee." However, since
Congress did not act upon Senate Bill S. 2138,30 the New Act's lack of
a precise definition for "employee" induced the emergence of other
issues.3 1
Work For Hire, CoM. ARTS, May-June 1984, at 15. Crawford quoted Senator Cochran's
statement to Congress regarding S. 2138 as follows:
Because publishers enjoy a superior bargaining position, they are able to de-
mand a work-for-hire contract as a condition of publication.... Mr. President,
our copyright laws were enacted to promote and protect the creation of liter-
ary, artistic, musical, and other works. Yet our work-for-hire laws are depriv-
ing all artists, not only the new, young creators, of much of the income
generated by their work; and, in many cases are forcing them to abandon their
careers. Society will be deprived inevitably of the richness that diversity of
style and interpretation bring to literary and artistic expression unless Con-
gress acts.
27. Crawford, supra note 26, at 15.
28. S. 2138, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see also Colby, Employmentfor Hire, 1984
A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT L. 307. This committee report recom-
mended pre-legislative panel discussions, as in the 1976 Act and S. 2044, to resolve the
issues raised by S. 2138. There is no record that such Congressional discussions were
ever held.
29. S. 2138, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
30. June Walton, of Senator Cochran's staff, explained that if a bill has not been
acted upon before the end of the Congressional session, it "dies." In order for the bill
to receive further consideration, it must be reintroduced at the next session. Tele-
phone interview with June Walton (Apr. 7, 1986).
31. "[N]either the text of the Act nor the Committee Reports make any attempt
to define the key terms, 'employee' and 'scope of employment.'" M. NIMMER, supra
note 5, § 5.03(B)(1) (1986). But see PRELIMINARY DRArT, supra note 14, at 273-74. Dur-
ing the discussions to draft the bill, Samuel W. Tannenbaum suggested that the words
"employer and employee" be substituted by "master and servant." The suggestion was
rejected by Abraham L. Kaminstein, the then-acting Register of Copyrights and
chairperson of the committee discussion, because it sounded "medieval."
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IV. THE MYTHICAL BEAST: COMMISSIONED EMPLOYEES FOR HIRE
Recent cases have had to decide whether a commissioned worker
whose work does not fall into one of the nine categories 32 could qual-
ify as an employee for hire under the "work made for hire"
definition.33
A. Today's Beast
The case of Peregrine v. Lauren Corp.34 typifies the current status
of commissioned workers under the "work made for hire" definition.
The case involved an advertising agency which verbally commis-
sioned the plaintiff to take photographs for use in a brochure. The
photographer delivered the pictures, but the agency refused to pay
the artist for his services, claiming that the charges were excessive.3 5
To encourage payment, the photographer registered copyright for the
photographs and sued for infringement.3 6 The advertising agency at-
tacked subject matter jurisdiction by claiming that the photographer
did not own the copyright due to the "work made for hire" provisions
in the New Act.
3 7
In an attempt to state the applicable law the district court incom-
pletely expressed it as "[a] work prepared by an employee in the
scope of his or her employment ... ,"38 Rather than state the "work
made for hire" definition in its entirety, the court chose to disregard
the provision for "specially ordered or commissioned works" here
and throughout the entire opinion.
However, the court did not fail to look up the meaning of em-
32. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
33. Irwin Karp anticipated such an issue during discussions for a preliminary draft
of the New Act. See PRELIMINARY DRAFr (Karp), supra note 14, at 274.
34. 601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985).
35. The amount was $4200. Id.
36. The New Act provides as follows:
In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or
within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima fa-
cie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the cer-
tificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a registration
made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court.
17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
The court mistakenly cited § 401(b), which actually concerns the form of copyright
notice. Peregrine, 601 F. Supp. at 828. In the next sentence the court makes another
citation error by saying that § 201(a) provides that a copyright vests at the moment of
creation. Id. Rather, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982) should have been cited by the court.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982) says that only the legal or beneficial owner may insti-
tute an action for infringement.
38. Peregrine, 601 F. Supp. at 828.
ployee3 9 in Melville Nimmer's treatise on copyright. The court
quoted the treatise which stated that "the crucial question in deter-
mining an employment relationship is whether the alleged employer
has the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the writer
performs his work."40 The court then concluded that the plaintiff
was an employee because the advertising agency had the right to tell
the photographer what to do.
Hypothetically, if the photographer was not an employee, the court
stated that "[i]t is instructive to consider the longstanding presump-
tion that the mutual intent of parties to the creation of an artistic
work, whether employer/employee or independent contractor, was to
vest title to the copyright in the person at whose insistence and ex-
pense the work was done."41 This statement is erroneous because it
disregards the "work made for hire" definition as stated in the New
Act. Furthermore, even if the court's interpretation was correct
under the common law, section 301 and its legislative history make
clear that Congress intended the New Act to preempt and replace
previous copyright law.4 2
39. Professor Nimmer applies the general agency doctrine relating to master and
servant. M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 5.03(B)(1)(a) (1986).
"Master and servant" refers to an "employer-employee" relationship. The relation-
ship develops from an express or implied employment contract between a master (em-
ployer) and servant (employee). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
The servant is expected to perform services, usually for salary, and is under the
master's control. An independent contractor is distinguished as one who is not under
the employer's direct control, but serves the employer only as to the results of her
work, but not as to the method by which the work is done. Id. § 220. But see Id. § 2,
comment d:
The words 'master' and 'servant' are frequently used with a limited mean-
ing in statutes. The definition of these words in this section are not applicable
in the interpretation of such statutes.
The word 'employee' is commonly used in current statutes to indicate the
type of person herein described as servant.
Id. (emphasis added).
40. Peregrine, 601 F. Supp. at 828-29 (quoting M. NIMMER, supra note 5,
§ 5.03(B)(1)(a) (1986). Nimmer cites Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d
548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984) (sufficiently supervised commissioned
artist was deemed an employee); Gallery House, Inc. v. Yi, 582 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (a directly supervised freelance artist was considered to be an employee); Aitken
v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982) (court considered the issue of
whether a commissioned architect was sufficiently supervised to be deemed an em-
ployee). But see Mister B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (a work created by a commissioned designer could not qualify as a
work made for hire where it did not conform to one of the nine categories in part two
of the work-made-for-hire definition); and H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737.
41. Peregrine, 601 F. Supp. at 829.
42. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. See also Latman & Ginsburg, Work
Made For Hire, 190 N.Y.L.J. Nov. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 1. (Alan Latman and Jane Gins-
berg state that "a 'work made for hire' under the 1909 Act could embrace independent
contractor situations," but "[u]nder the 1976 Act, if there is no regular employment re-
lationship, a commissioned work is not a work made for hire unless the work fits cer-
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B. Before the Beast: Days of Fidelity to Legislative History
An appropriate response to the Peregrine decision is to decipher
how case law has regressed toward legendary interpretations. The
first instance in which a federal court had been asked to construe the
reach of the "work for hire" provision of the New Act occurred in
Mister B Textiles v. Woodcrest Fabrics.43 The case involved an al-
leged copyright infringement of a fabric design by a manufacturer.
Woodcrest, the infringer, defended by claiming that Mister B did not
truly own the copyright to the fabric design. Woodcrest based its ar-
gument on the "work made for hire" definition of the New Act.44
The facts of this case indicate that a commissioned designer created
a new fabric pattern with participation of Mister B's employee. Mis-
tain specified categories, and the parties agree in writing that the work be considered a
work made for hire." Id. at 4, col. 1-2).
The authors were analyzing two cases: Childers v. High Society Magazine, 557 F.
Supp. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) and Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 961 (1983).
Childers involved a freelance photographer who filed suit for infringement. The de-
fendant argued that common law should govern rather than the statutory law defini-
tions. The court rejected this claim, stating that the New Act had changed the law for
commissioned works. Childers, 557 F. Supp. at 984.
The Roth court affirmed Childers by stating that the dual system of common law
and statutory law was abolished, and thus federal copyright law governed all infringe-
ment claims arising after 1978. Roth, 710 F.2d at 938.
Roth further commented on the legislative history of the New Act: "The legislative
history of § 301 makes clear a congressional intent to preempt previous law and re-
place the labyrinth of statutory and common law authority with a single, generally ap-
plicable federal statute." Id. at 938. In addition, the case quoted House of
Representatives Report Number 1476:
Instead of a dual system of 'common law copyright' for unpublished works
and statutory copyright for published works ... the bill adopts a single system
of Federal statutory copyright from creation .... Common law copyright pro-
tection for works coming within the scope of the statute would be abrogated,
and.., a single Federal system [would be substituted for] the present anach-
ronistic, uncertain, impractical and highly complicated dual system.
Roth, 710 F.2d at 938-39 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No.1476, 94th Cong. 2d
Sess. 129, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5745).
Roth involved a freelance writer who filed suit for additional royalties pursuant to
an oral contract. Since there was no written agreement between the parties stating
that her contribution to a best selling book would be "work for hire", the plaintiff
would have prevailed under the 1976 Act. However, the district court had ruled that
the plaintiff entered the contract prior to the effective date of the New Act, January 1,
1978. The court of appeals affirmed that the New Act could be applied only prospec-
tively, not retroactively. Roth, 701 F.2d at 936-37. For further analysis of Roth v. Pri-
tikin see Note, The Freelancer's Trap: Work for Hire Under the Copyright Act of 1976,
86 W. VA. L. REV. 1305 (1983-84).
43. 523 F. Supp. 21, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
44. Section 301(a) says that all equitable rights to tangible works created after
January 1, 1978 are governed exclusively by the New Act. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1983).
ter B proved to the court that the designer proceeded under its direc-
tion.45  However, Woodcrest contended that in order for a
commissioned work to qualify as a "work for hire" the work must fit
into one of the nine categories and, in addition, the parties must
agree in writing that the work is for hire.46 On this issue the court
sided with Woodcrest, the infringing party. The court agreed that "a
fabric design produced by an independent contractor at the request of
another party could not be a work for hire," and therefore "the in-
dependent contractor would be the 'author' of the work and copy-
right owner. '47 To further substantiate its interpretation, the court
quoted the part of the New Act's legislative history which describes
the operation of the "work for hire" provision: "[t]he definition now
provided by the bill represents a compromise which, in effect, spells
out those specific categories of commissioned works that can be con-
sidered 'works made for hire' under certain circumstances." 48
The court could have stopped its analysis at this point and dis-
missed the suit, despite the wrongful act of infringement by the pre-
vailing party. However, in order to prevent the infringing party from
prevailing, the court determined that the close working relationship
had produced a "joint work."49 "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by
two or more authors with the intention that their contribution be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole."5 0 As co-creators of a "joint work," Mister B's employee and
the commissioned designer qualified as co-owners of copyright in the
work. Co-ownership status gave Mr. B the requisite interest it
needed to maintain the suit and eventually prove infringement. 51
More importantly, the court was able to come to an equitable deci-
sion while adhering to the mandates of the New Act and its legisla-
tive history.
45. Mister B Textiles, 523 F. Supp. at 24-25.
46. Id. at 24.
47. Id. The court also pointed out that the commissioned party could transfer
rights in writing to the commissioning party. This rule is supported by 17 U.S.C. § 204
(1982). Apparently, no such contract existed between Mister B and the designer.
48. Mister B Textiles, 523 F. Supp. at 24; see H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d
Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737; see also supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
49. Mister B Textiles, 523 F. Supp. at 25.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
51. "Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or
authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the
work." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
The court also refers to the legislative description of "joint works." "Under the Bill,
as under present law, co-owners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants
in common, with each owner having an independent right to use or license the work."
Mister B Textiles, 523 F. Supp. at 25. Note, however, that the court erroneously cited
to page 120 in the House of Representatives Report while the actual location of the
description is as follows: H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5736.
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The decision in Mister B was followed in several subsequent deci-
sions,52 but has been ignored after the court of appeals negated the
distinction between employees and independent contractors in Aldon
Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.53
C. Three Mythical Beasts Surface: Two in The Orient and One
Somewhere Else
Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.54 held that statuettes
sculpted by artisans who were sufficiently supervised independent
contractors, qualified as "work made for hire."55 By so holding, the
Second Circuit invented a third subdivision in addition to the original
two subdivisions in the work for hire definition.56
The unfortunate thing about Aldon is that it gives credence to simi-
lar cases, such as Peregrine57 and Town of C7arkstown v. Reeder,5 8
which have regressed to pre-New Act common law in their interpre-
tation of work for hire. The common law test that these cases used
to determine whether a creation was "work for hire" was merely
whether or not the commissioning party had the right to supervise
and direct the work.59 Aldon, at the very least, qualified the "right to
52. Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1983) (see supra, note 42 for a descrip-
tion of this case); see also May v. Morganelli-Heuman & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.4
(9th Cir. 1980) (Architect had drawn plans prior to 1978, thus the New Act was not
applicable. However, the court said that if the New Act was retroactive, the architect
would not be subject to "work for hire" because of the lack of writing and nonapplica-
bility of the architectural drawings to the proscribed categories.); Everts v. Arkham
House Publishers, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 145, 148 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (A poet was the sole cre-
ator and there was no written agreement that the poems were "work made for hire."
The court ruled that only certain categories of commissioned works fall within the
"work for hire" definition of the New Act.); Aitken, v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F.
Supp. 252, 256 (D. Neb. 1982) (A commissioned architect was not a "worker for hire"
because his designs did not fit into the statutory categories, and there was not a writ-
ten "work for hire" agreement. However, the court proceeded to analyze whether the
architect was subject to adequate direction and control in order to qualify as an em-
ployee according to common law.); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D. N.J. 1981)
(Homeowner claimed he owned the architectural plans to his house alleging that the
house's architect was subject to "work for hire." The architect was not considered a
"worker for hire" since architectural drawings are not within the proscribed categories
and there was not a signed agreement stating that a "work for hire" situation existed.).
53. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 552.
56. Interview with noted copyright law expert Richard Colby, Professor, Pep-
perdine University School of Law (Jan. 25, 1986).
57. 601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985).
58. 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
59. Ginsberg & Goldberg, Copyright Law, 1984 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 515, 522.
supervise and direct" by requiring that the commissioning party "ac-
tually and substantially exercise.., the right."60
Aldon's interpretation of the work for hire definition emerged out
of the following scenario. Aldon Accessories, Ltd. wanted to make
and mass market statuettes of a winged horse and a unicorn. Aldon's
president prepared rough sketches and arranged for oriental artists
to sculpt the models.6 1 Subsequently, the president made a special
trip to the Far East and worked closely with artists in Japan and Tai-
wan.62 After the works were completed, Aldon registered its claims
to copyright and identified itself as the author under the "work made
for hire" provision.6 3 Spiegel, the defendant, later sold unauthorized
copies of the works. Aldon sued for infringement and won in the dis-
trict court.6 4
On appeal Spiegel contended that the works were not works made
for hire, and therefore Aldon did not have standing to sue as the
copyright owner. Spiegel based its allegation on the fact that sculp-
tured works are not within the nine categories and that there was no
signed writing which stated that the works were made for hire. The
defendant further appealed on the basis that the jury instruction fo-
cused on "whether the hiring author caused the work to be made and
exercised the right to direct and supervise the creation."6 5 Spiegel
challenged the jury instruction because it allowed the jury to find
eventually that the statuettes were made for hire by commissioned
workers even though the works did not fit into one of the nine cate-
gories and there was no written instrument as required by subdivi-
sion (2) of the "work made for hire" definition.66
In a brief analysis that discussed Aldon and Town of Clarkstown v.
Reeder,6 7 one commentator succinctly explained the situation.
These two decisions, by relying on the commissioning party's right to direct
and supervise the outside contractor, threaten to blur the statutory distinction
between the works of 'employees' and 'specially ordered or commissioned
works.' Arguably, in separating these two types of works, Congress intended
that the products of outside contractors would be considered works made for
hire only under narrowly defined circumstances .... By redefining certain
outside contractors as employees, these courts may be depriving outside con-
tractors of the copyright ownership which Congress had intended to secure
them.6
8
In its analysis the Aldon court first applied the New Act in accord-
ance with congressional intent. Before the court invented and con-
60. Id.
61. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 549.
62. Id. at 549-50.
63. Id. at 550.
64. Id. at 549.
65. Id. at 551.
66. Id.
67. 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
68. Ginsberg & Goldberg, supra note 59, at 522.
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tributed a third subdivision to the statutory work for hire definition,
it had correctly determined the status of the sculpted work as not
"made for hire." The court stated, "Spiegel is correct that the statu-
ettes could not be considered works for hire under subdivision (2) of
the new statutory definition."6 9 This finding can be attributed to nu-
merous sources which explain that, according to subdivision (2), un-
less a specially ordered or commissioned work fits into one of the
nine categories and the parties have agreed in writing that the work
is for hire, it cannot be deemed a "work made for hire."7 0
The primary source of interpretation is the "work made for hire"
definition itself. On its face it distinguishes those works that may not
qualify as "work for hire," and those that may if the specific subdivi-
sion (2) requirements are met.71 Likewise, the legislative history ex-
plains that "[t]he definition now provided by the bill represents a
compromise which, in effect, spells out those specific categories of
commissioned works that can be considered 'works made for hire'
under certain circumstances."7 2 This understanding of the law was
shared by case law, Professor Nimmer, and other authorities on
copyright. 73
Since sculptured works are not included in the nine categories, the
Aldon court made a correct preliminary determination that a com-
missioned sculptor was not subject to "work for hire."74 Hypotheti-
cally, if the work had fit into a category known as "sculptured
works," the work could not have been "for hire" due to the undis-
puted fact that there was no written "work for hire" agreement be-
tween Aldon and the commissioned artists. 7 5
However, in order to circumvent the previously understood mean-
ing of "work made for hire," the court explained that Spiegel gave an
"overly restrictive"76 interpretation to subdivision (1) of the work for
hire definition: "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of
69. Alson Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1984).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121,
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737; M. NIMMER, supra note 5,
§ 5.03(B)(2)(a); Latman & Ginsberg, supra note 42, at 96.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
72. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737.
73. M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 5.03(B)(2)(a); Latman & Ginsberg, supra note 42,
at 96; Boorstyn, Aldon v. Spiegel 1 COPYRIGHT L.J. 38, 39 (1984).
74. Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1984).
75. Id. at 553.
76. Id. at 551-52.
his or her employment.. .. -77 The court went on to determine that
since Aldon's president sat with the artist and told him what to do,
the artist was thus sufficiently supervised and directed to be deemed
an employee.78
The use of the "sufficiently supervised and directed" test can be at-
tributed to one of many criteria traditionally used to determine the
employer/employee relationship.79 Since there is no definition for
"employee" in the New Act, the court cited copyright law expert,
Melville Nimmer, to justify its reliance on agency law.80 In his trea-
tise on copyright, Nimmer said to apply the general law of agency
which in turn says that the strongest indicator of an employer/em-
ployee relationship is whether one person has the right to direct and
control the work of another.81
Under the circumstances of this case, the court's use of Nimmer's
suggestion to apply the general law of agency to define employee is
both ironic and misleading.82 The court relied upon Nimmer to ra-
tionalize that a definition of work for hire that does not consider "di-
rection and control" is overly restrictive.8 3 However, the court did
not cite Nimmer in regard to his understanding of the "work made
for hire" definition.8 4 Nimmer believed that the status of a specially
ordered or commissioned work was limited to the nine categories.
If a work does not fall within one of the above [nine] categories then even if it
has been prepared by one person upon the special order or commission of an-
other it will not qualify as a 'work made for hire,' with the special legal conse-
77. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
78. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 553.
79. In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an in-
dependent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are consid-
ered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the works;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the em-
ployer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
80. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552.
81. M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 5.03(B)(1)(a).
82. See Id., § 5.03(B)(2)(a).
83. See Aldon, 783 F.2d at 551-52.
84. Id. at 548-54.
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quences that flow from this designation.
8 5
By presenting an incomplete view of Nimmer's guidelines, the court
was able to use Nimmer's expertise to justify an opinion that Nim-
mer himself would not have supported.8 6
Arguably, the court overlooked Nimmer's actual interpretation be-
cause it was persuaded by the plaintiff's predicament; Aldon, a
smaller company, was up against a goliath corporation.8 7 Another
possible motivation for the court was its uneasiness with the inequi-
table outcome that may have resulted if it had conformed its opinion
to the generally accepted understanding of the "work for hire" defi-
nition.88 For example, the alleged infringing party would have es-
caped liability because the alleged owner would have been stripped of
its rights to claim ownership and to maintain a cause of action.
Therefore, the situation suggests that the court made a result ori-
ented decision and used a little of its own creativity to avoid what it
possibly believed to be an unfair outcome.8 9 Applying the same logic,
if the action had been between the commissioned artist and Aldon,
the court probably would not have found that an employer/employee
relationship existed using the same facts.90
Notwithstanding these logical assumptions, the courts do not neces-
sarily give a commissioned worker the benefit of the doubt when he
is a party to an action. Cases such as Peregrine have used Aldon-type
interpretations to deprive writers and artists of the copyright protec-
tion that Congress had intended to secure for them.91 The result of
85. M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 5.03(B)(1) (1985).
86. See id.
87. At least two commentators have said that the Aldon outcome has "the superfi-
cial appeal of the 'little guy' beating the 'big guy.'" FitzGibbon and Kendall, The Uni-
corn in the Courtroom: The Concept of "Supervising and Directing" an Artistic
Creation Is a Mythical Beast in the Copyright Law, J. ARTS MGMT. & L., Fall 1985, at
23, 41.
88. In his commentary on the Aldon case, Boorstyn stated:
It should be noted that in this case the commissioning party, as copyright
owner, sued an infringer. Had the Court found that plaintiff was not the
copyright owner, the infringer could have escaped liability. It is possible that
had the action been between the commissioned party and the commissioning
party to determine copyright ownership, the result may have been different.
In other words, in that situation, it may have been found that the commission-
ing party did not exercise sufficient direction and supervision so as to own the
copyright.
Boorstyn, supra note 73, at 39.
89. Id. at 39-40.
90. See generally Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 549-64 (2d
Cir. 1984).
91. Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985); see also Iris Arc v.
S.S. Sarna, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (sculptor who had worked closely
Aldon's attempt to make an equitable decision is most clearly seen in
light of such cases.
It is possible that the Aldon court did not realize the repercussions
of its interpretation. By removing the distinction between commis-
sioned workers and employees as set forth in the New Act, the court
has deprived many commissioned workers of copyright ownership.92
According to Aldon, a commissioned worker may be deemed an em-
ployee if the commissioning party sufficiently supervises the
worker.93 In terms of the New Act this means that subdivision (1)
encompasses subdivision (2).94
Although the court disregarded what Nimmer said about commis-
sioned workers for hire being limited to the nine categories, the
court's interpretation might have been valid if it were not for two ob-
vious factors: both the language of the New Act itself and its legisla-
tive history indicate statutory distinctions between those works that
can be considered works made for hire and those that cannot.95 Sec-
tion 101 of the New Act defines "work made for hire" in part as, "(1)
a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as
a contribution to a collective work .. . ."96 The word or is used to
express an alternative, and to give a choice between two or more
things. Or can also mean and.97 The New Act's use of or, especially
in combination with the subsection numbers, tends to divide the defi-
nition into two parts. Even if or means and, the two-part nature of
the definition would remain intact.98
Similarly, section 201(b) uses the word or "[iln the case of a work
made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title. .... 99
Here or is used to differentiate between employers and those who
commission or specially order works within the nine categories. If
Congress had intended employers to encompass certain commission-
with employees of the commissioning party was deemed to have created works made
for hire); Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (volunteer
author was deemed an employee of the town that commissioned him because the com-
missioning party had the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the writer
performed his work).
92. See Ginsberg & Goldberg, supra note 59, at 522.
93. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552.
94. At least one commentator explained that if any commissioned work can be a
work for hire under subdivision (1) because the commissioning party exercised direc-
tion and control, then the subdivision (2) requirements are of little value. Crawford,
Works Made For Hire: An Update on Copyright Law, COMM. ARTS, May/June 1986, at
10, 18.
95. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
97. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 987 (5th ed. 1979).
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
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ing parties it is doubtful that it would have used or in this section. 0 0
Congress's use of the phrase "other person for whom the work was
prepared" in section 201(b) casts more doubt upon the Aldon deci-
sion. If, as set forth in Aldon, "the term 'employer' were intended to
include 'independent contractor' within its meaning then there would
have been no need to include the emphasized language."1o1 Although
he would not embrace the preceding observation, the commentator
who made it, further conceded that "section 201(b) supports the view
that the definition of works made for hire in section 101 creates mu-
tually exclusive categories for work prepared by employees and work
prepared by independent contractors."l0 2
Concerning the legislative history, Aldon correctly stated that
"new work for hire" laws were designed to correct "an injustice in
those situations where the contractor did all of the creative work and
the hiring party did little or nothing."1os Paradoxically, within the
same paragraph, the court challenged Congress's intent for a more
just and constitutional system.10 4 The court stated, "There is no indi-
cation in the legislative history or elsewhere that Congress was focus-
ing on contractors who were actually sufficiently supervised and
directed by the hiring party to be considered 'employees' acting
within 'the scope of employment.' "105 While founding its decision on
what Congress did not say, the court disregarded what Congress did
say, as well as how the development of the New Act supported Con-
gress's stated intentions.
During the early stages of the New Act's development, no commis-
sioned work could be deemed a work made for hire.10 6 The Act
evolved through the process of Congress adding specific exceptions to
the clause concerning commissioned works.10 7 As a result, certain
works could be considered works made for hire if the parties agreed
in a written instrument. 08 Furthermore, Congress never lost sight
of the idea that, in general, specially ordered or commissioned works
100. O'Meara, Works Made For Hire: Under the Copyright Act of 1976-Two Inter-
pretations, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 523, 532 (1982).
101. Id. at 532.
102. Id.
103. Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1984).
104. See id.
105. Id. at 552.
106. Crawford, supra note 94, at 18.
107. See A. LATMAN & J. LIGHTSTONE, supra note 13, at 327.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
would not be deemed work for hire.109
A more detailed review of the New Act's development reveals that
in 1963 a preliminary draft bill defined work made for hire as "a
work prepared by an employee within the scope of the duties of his
employment, but not including a work made on special order or com-
mission."" 0 Note that even if this language were law, under an Al-
don analysis any commissioned worker could qualify as an
employee."' In fact, it would be easier to find a work made for hire
despite the unequivocal language. In theory, due to the requirement
of a written "work for hire" agreement, it should have been more dif-
ficult for a court to find a work made for hire under the New Act.112
Apparently, based on the endorsement of this early draft by repre-
sentatives for authors, and strong opposition by publishers, nobody
imagined that a resourceful court could find a way to classify any
commissioned work as "work made for hire." Believing that the pro-
posed act was against their interests, publishers and motion picture
companies expressed their reasons for opposition and eventually per-
suaded the drafters to change the proposed act.113
Faced with the task of making changes while preserving the foun-
dation of the previous draft, the drafters' problem was "how to draw
the proper definitional line" between commissioned works that
could be deemed work for hire and those that could not." 4 The draft-
ers solved the problem by introducing four specific categories of com-
missioned works that could be considered work made for hire "if the
parties agree in writing."" 5 The number of categories was eventu-
ally expanded, but none of the categories ever included the suffi-
ciently supervised commissioned worker.116 Furthermore, "[n]othing
in this legislative history suggests that Congress ever intended to al-
low commissioned works to be work for hire without a written con-
tract--or, in the version which became law, a written contract
relating to work in certain limited categories." 7
109. The legislative history does not suggest that Congress ever intended that any
commissioned works other than those listed in the nine specific categories be deemed
"work made for hire." See Crawford, supra note 94, at 23.
110. SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67, re-
printed in 9 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 66 (1982).
111. Crawford, supra note 94, at 18.
112. See SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 110, at 67.
113. See id. at 66-67.
114. SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 110, at 67 (emphasis
added).
115. Id.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
117. Crawford, supra note 94, at 23.
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V. THE FALLEN KNIGHT: PICKING UP THE PIECES
For most commissioned workers the new "work made for hire"
definition has been the source of copyright ownership and all of the
potential benefits which result.118 However, the New Act has sanc-
tioned the loss of valuable rights and income in the publishing indus-
try.119 Furthermore, as a result of Aldon v. Spiegel, all commissioned
workers, Famous Artist included, potentially share the plight of
someone like Robin Brickman. Robin is the freelance book illustra-
tor who alleged, "The theft of my income was sanctioned by copy-
right law."' 20
In response to a situation where copyright ownership is determined
at the discretion of the courts,1 2 ' new legislation has recently been
introduced to rejuvenate "work for hire." The proposed amendments
to the New Act are specifically designed 'to benefit commissioned
workers in the publishing industries, and to restore the rights of all
who are threatened by Aldon's "control and supervision" test.122
Introduced in the 99th Session of Congress, Senate Bill 2330 would
amend subdivision (1) as follows: "a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment if the employee receives
all employment benefits due under applicable State and Federal law
and the employer withholds taxes from such payments to the em-
ployee and remits such taxes to the Internal Revenue Service."123
Subdivision (2) would be changed to include only specially ordered or
commissioned works "for use as a part of motion pictures" if the par-
ties sign a work for hire agreement "prior to the commencement of
any work."124 To reject the idea that Congress intends for there to
be any court-created subdivisions12s the amendment states, "Unless
the work falls within either clause (1) or clause (2), it cannot be work
made for hire."126
In part, this bill acts to reverse Aldon's regression from the man-
118. According to the New Act, not every specially ordered or commissioned work
is considered "work made for hire"-only those listed in the nine categories. See M.
NIMMER, supra note 5, § 5.03(B)(2)(a) (1985).
119. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
121. In the courts, determining the status of copyright ownership for commissioned
workers has become a question of fact. Boorstyn, supra note 73, at 39.
122. Text of S. 2330 and Introductory Remarks, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA No. 32), May 1, 1986, at 18.
123. Id. at 19.
124. Id.
125. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
126. See BNA Journal, supra note 122, at 19.
date that in order for a commissioned work to be deemed "work for
hire," the work must fit into one of the nine categories, and the par-
ties must agree in writing that the work is "made for hire."127 Since
the bill's preciseness would clarify the "work for hire" definition,128
perhaps Aldon should be credited with exposing the definition's am-
biguities as a step toward improving the end result.
While the New Act was still in development, a representative for
lyricists and composers stood before the Senate. He testified as
follows:
Let me make a suggestion to those of you whose son says he intends to be a
poet, a painter, or a musician; put some money aside for him, he is going to
need it. If our copyright law concerns itself more with the protection of mam-
moth industrial complexes, rather than with those whose works enable these
industries to thrive, a career in the arts will remain the most precarious un-
dertaking our society affords.
No society in history that we admire today eschewed the arts. If ours is to
be a truly great society, it will be so only if it promotes the progress of the
arts, as our Constitution so clearly states.1 2 9
Unless Congress clarifies the "work made for hire" definition, the
speaker's reminder will continue to be especially relevant. Until
then, "work for hire" will lie on the ground trampled by Aldon's uni-
corn, burned by Famous's dragon.
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127. Crawford, supra note 94, at 23.
128. Id.
129. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of
the Committee of the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 897 (1965) reprinted in 9 COpY-
RIGHT LAW REVISION 863, 897 (statement of Robert Emmet Dolan, Composers and Lyr-
icists of America, accompanied by Leonard Zissu, General Counsel, Composers and
Lyricists Guild).
